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adjusted capital asset pricing model, a security’s required return depends on its expected
liquidity as well as on the covariances of its own return and liquidity with the market return
and liquidity. In addition, a persistent negative shock to a security’s liquidity results in low
contemporaneous returns and high predicted future returns. The model provides a unified
framework for understanding the various channels through which liquidity risk may affect
asset prices. Our empirical results shed light on the total and relative economic significance of
these channels and provide evidence of flight to liquidity.
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Liquidity is risky and has commonalty: it varies over time both for individual
stocks and for the market as a whole (Chordia et al., 2000; Hasbrouck and Seppi,
2001; Huberman and Halka, 1999). Liquidity risk is often noted in the financial
press. For instance:
The possibility that liquidity might disappear from a market, and so not be
available when it is needed, is a big source of risk to an investor.
—The Economist, September 23, 1999
...there is also broad belief among users of financial liquidity—traders, investors
and central bankers—that the principal challenge is not the average level of
financial liquidity... but its variability and uncertainty....
—Persaud (2003)
This paper presents a simple theoretical model that helps explain how asset prices
are affected by liquidity risk and commonality in liquidity. The model provides a
unified theoretical framework that can explain the empirical findings that return
sensitivity to market liquidity is priced (Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003), that average
liquidity is priced (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986), and that liquidity comoves with
returns and predicts future returns (Amihud, 2002; Chordia et al., 2001a; Jones,
2001; Bekaert et al., 2003).
In our model, risk-averse agents in an overlapping generations economy trade
securities whose liquidity varies randomly over time. We solve the model explicitly
and derive a liquidity-adjusted capital asset pricing model (CAPM). Our model of
liquidity risk complements the existing theoretical literature on asset pricing with
constant trading frictions (see, for instance, Amihud and Mendelson, 1986;
Constantinides, 1986; Vayanos, 1998; Vayanos and Vila, 1999; Duffie et al., 2000,
2003; Huang, 2003; Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen, 2004). In the liquidity-adjusted CAPM,
the expected return of a security is increasing in its expected illiquidity and its ‘‘net
beta,’’ which is proportional to the covariance of its return, ri; net of its exogenous1
illiquidity costs, ci; with the market portfolio’s net return, rM  cM : The net beta can
be decomposed into the standard market beta and three betas representing different
forms of liquidity risk. These liquidity risks are associated with: (i) commonality in
liquidity with the market liquidity, covðci; cMÞ; (ii) return sensitivity to market
liquidity, covðri; cM Þ; and, (iii) liquidity sensitivity to market returns, covðci; rM Þ:
We explore the cross-sectional predictions of the model using NYSE and AMEX
stocks over the period 1963 to 1999. We use the illiquidity measure of Amihud (2002)
to proxy for ci: We find that the liquidity-adjusted CAPM fares better than the
standard CAPM in terms of R2 for cross-sectional returns and p-values in
specification tests, even though both models employ exactly one degree of freedom.1While research on endogenous time-variation in illiquidity is sparse, Eisfeldt (2004) presents a model in
which real-sector liquidity fluctuates with productivity, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2004b) show how
predatory trading can lead to illiquidity when liquidity is most needed, and Brunnermeier and Pedersen
(2004a) show how market liquidity varies with dealers’ ‘‘funding liquidity.’’
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size, but the model cannot explain the cross-sectional returns associated with the
book-to-market effect.
An interesting result that emerges from our empirical exercises based on Amihud’s
illiquidity measure is that illiquid securities also have high liquidity risk, consistent
with ‘‘flight to liquidity’’ in times of down markets or generally illiquid markets. In
particular, a security that has high average illiquidity, ci; also tends to have high
commonality in liquidity with the market liquidity, high return sensitivity to market
liquidity, and high liquidity sensitivity to market returns.
While this collinearity is itself interesting, it also complicates the task of
distinguishing statistically the relative return impacts of liquidity, liquidity
risk, and market risk. There is, however, some evidence that the total effect
of the three liquidity risks matters over and above market risk and the level of
liquidity.
It is interesting to consider the total and relative economic significance of liquidity
level and each of the three liquidity risks by evaluating their contribution to cross-
sectional return differences. It is difficult, however, to accurately distinguish the
relative economic effects because of the inherent collinearity in the data. One of the
benefits of having an economic model is that it provides a restrictive structure under
which the identification problem is alleviated. Under the model’s restrictions,
liquidity risk contributes on average about 1.1% annually to the difference in risk
premium between stocks with high expected illiquidity and low expected illiquidity.
We decompose the effect of liquidity risk into the contribution from each of the three
kinds of risk, recognizing that these estimates are subject to error and rely on the
validity of the model: First, we estimate that the return premium due to commonality in liquidity,
covðci; cM Þ; is 0.08%. Hence, while the model shows that investors require a
return premium for a security that is illiquid when the market as a whole is
illiquid, this effect appears to be small. The commonality in liquidity has been
documented by Chordia et al. (2000), Huberman and Halka (1999), and
Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001), but these papers do not study the implications for
required returns. Second, we estimate that the return premium due to covðri; cM Þ is 0.16%. This
model-implied premium stems from the preference of investors for securities with
high returns when the market is illiquid. Pastor and Stambaugh (2003)
find empirical support for this effect using monthly data over 34 years with a
measure of liquidity that they construct based on the return reversals induced by
order flow. Third, we estimate that the return premium due to covðci; rMÞ is 0.82%.
Intuitively, investors are willing to pay a premium for a security that is liquid
when the market return is low. We note that covðci; rMÞ appears to be the most
important source of liquidity risk although it has not previously been considered
in the academic literature. However, it is reflected in industry practices such as
legal disclaimers for certain asset management firms; e.g.,
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these stocks during market downturns (illiquidity).
—Legal Disclaimer, Investec Asset Management, 2004.2
The return premium due to the level of liquidity is calibrated based on the average
turnover to be 3.5%, thus the combined effect of the differences in liquidity risks and
differences in the level of liquidity is estimated to be 4.6% per year. These estimates
of the relative importance of liquidity level and the liquidity risks depend on the
model-implied restrictions of a single risk premium and a level effect consistent with
the turnover. If we depart from the model restrictions and estimate each liquidity
risk premium as a free parameter then the economic effect of liquidity risk appears to
be larger, but the unrestricted premia are estimated with little precision. Pastor and
Stambaugh (2003) find a large (7.5%) effect of liquidity risk (covðri; cM Þ) using an
unrestricted liquidity risk premium and without controlling for the level of liquidity.
Finally, the model also shows that since liquidity is persistent,3 liquidity predicts
future returns and liquidity co-moves with contemporaneous returns. This is because
a positive shock to illiquidity predicts high future illiquidity, which raises the
required return and lowers contemporaneous prices. This may help explain the
empirical findings of Amihud et al. (1990), Amihud (2002), Chordia et al. (2001a),
Jones (2001), and Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) in the U.S. stock market, and of
Bekaert et al. (2003) in emerging markets.
In summary, we offer a simple theoretical framework that illustrates several
channels through which liquidity risk can affect asset prices. The model is a useful
first step in understanding how a number of recent empirical findings fit together.
Finally, our empirical analysis suggests that the effects of liquidity level and liquidity
risk are separate, although the analysis is made difficult by collinearity, and that one
channel for liquidity risk that has not been treated in the prior literature, namely
covðci; rMÞ; may be of empirical importance.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the economy. Section 3
derives the liquidity-adjusted capital asset pricing model and outlines how liquidity
predicts and co-moves with returns. Section 4 contains an empirical analysis. Section
5 concludes. Proofs are in the Appendix.2. Assumptions
The model assumes a simple overlapping generations economy in which a new
generation of agents is born at any time t 2 f. . . ;2;1; 0; 1; 2; . . .g (Samuelson,
1958). Generation t consists of N agents, indexed by n, who live for two periods, t
and t þ 1: Agent n of generation t has an endowment at time t and no other sources
of income, trades in periods t and t þ 1; and derives utility from consumption at time
t þ 1: He has constant absolute risk aversion An so that his preferences are2Source: http://www2.investecfunds.com/US/LegalDisclaimer/Index.cfm
3Amihud (2002), Chordia et al. (2000, 2001a,b), Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001), Huberman and Halka
(1999), Jones (2001), and Pastor and Stambaugh (2003).
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consumption at time t þ 1:
There are I securities indexed by i ¼ 1; . . . ; I with a total of Si shares of security i.
At time t, security i pays a dividend of Dit; has an ex-dividend share price of P
i
t; and
has an illiquidity cost of Cit; where D
i
t and C
i
t are random variables. All random
variables are defined on a probability space ðO;F;PÞ; and all random variables
indexed by t are measurable with respect to the filtration fFtg; representing the
information commonly available to investors. The illiquidity cost, Cit; is modeled
simply as the per-share cost of selling security i. Hence, agents can buy at Pit but must
sell at Pit  Cit: Short-selling is not allowed.
Uncertainty about the illiquidity cost is what generates the liquidity risk in this
model. Specifically, we assume that Dit and C
i
t are autoregressive processes of order
one, that is:
Dt ¼ D¯ þ rDðDt1  D¯Þ þ t ð1Þ
Ct ¼ C¯ þ rCðCt1  C¯Þ þ Zt, ð2Þ
where4 D¯; C¯ 2 RIþ are positive real vectors, rD;rC 2 ½0; 1; and ðt; ZtÞ is an
independent identically distributed normal process with mean EðtÞ ¼ EðZtÞ ¼ 0
and variance-covariance matrices varðtÞ ¼ SD; varðZtÞ ¼ SC ; and EðtZ>t Þ ¼ SCD:
We assume that agents can borrow and lend at a risk-free real return of rf41;
which is exogenous. This can be interpreted as an inelastic bond market, or a
generally available production technology that turns a unit of consumption at time t
into rf units of consumption at time t þ 1:
The assumptions with respect to agents, preferences, and dividends are strong.
These assumptions are made for tractability, and, as we shall see, they imply natural
closed-form results for prices and expected returns. The main result (Proposition 1)
applies more generally, however. It holds for an arbitrary increasing and concave
utility function defined on ð1;1Þ as long as conditional expected net returns are
normal,5 and also for an arbitrary return distribution and quadratic utility.
Furthermore, it can be viewed as a result of near-rational behavior, for instance, by
using a Taylor expansion of the utility function (see, for example, Huang and
Litzenberger, 1988; Markowitz, 2000; Cochrane, 2001). Our assumptions also allow
us to study return predictability caused by illiquidity (Proposition 2) and the co-
movements of returns and illiquidity (Proposition 3), producing insights that also
seem robust to the specification.
Perhaps the strongest assumption is that investors need to sell all their securities
after one period (when they die). In a more general setting with endogenous holding
periods, deriving a general equilibrium with time-varying liquidity is an onerous
task. While our model is mostly suggestive, it is helpful since it provides guidelines4For notational convenience, we assume that all securities have the same autocorrelation of dividends
and liquidity (rD and rC) although our results apply more generally.
5The normal returns assumption is an assumption about endogenous variables that is used in standard
CAPM analysis (for instance, Huang and Litzenberger, 1988). This assumption is satisfied in the
equilibrium of the model of this paper.
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assumption of overlapping generations can capture investors’ life-cycle motives for
trade (as in Vayanos, 1998; Constantinides et al., 2002), or can be viewed as a way of
capturing short investment horizons (as in De Long et al., 1990) and the large
turnover observed empirically in many markets.
It should also be noted that a narrow interpretation of the illiquidity cost, Cit; is
that it represents transactions costs such as broker fees and bid-ask spread, in line
with the literature on exogenous transactions costs. More broadly, however, the
illiquidity cost could represent other real costs, for instance, those arising from delay
and search associated with trade execution as in Duffie et al. (2000, 2002, 2003). The
novelty in our model arises from the fact that we allow this cost to be time-varying.3. Liquidity-adjusted capital asset pricing model
This section derives a liquidity-adjusted version of the capital asset pricing model
(CAPM) and studies its asset pricing implications.
We are interested in how an asset’s expected (gross) return,
rit ¼
Dit þ Pit
Pit1
, (3)
depends on its relative illiquidity cost,
cit ¼
Cit
Pit1
, (4)
on the market return,
rMt ¼
P
i S
iðDit þ PitÞP
i S
iPit1
, (5)
and on the relative market illiquidity,
cMt ¼
P
i S
iCitP
i S
iPit1
. (6)
In a competitive equilibrium of the model (henceforth referred to simply as
equilibrium), agents choose consumption and portfolios so as to maximize their
expected utility taking prices as given, and prices are determined such that markets
clear.
To determine equilibrium prices, consider first an economy with the same agents in
which asset i has a dividend of Dit  Cit and no illiquidity cost. In this imagined
economy, standard results imply that the CAPM holds (Markowitz, 1952; Sharpe,
1964; Lintner, 1965; Mossin, 1966). We claim that the equilibrium prices in the
original economy with frictions are the same as those of the imagined economy. This
follows from two facts: (i) the net return on a long position is the same in both
economies; and, (ii) all investors in the imagined economy hold a long position in the
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investor’s equilibrium return in the frictionless economy is feasible in the original
economy, and is also optimal, given the more limited investment opportunities due
to the short-selling constraints. (This argument applies more generally since positive
transactions costs imply that a short position has a worse payoff than minus the
payoff of a long position. We impose the short-sale constraint because C can be
negative in a setting with normal distributions.)
These arguments show that the CAPM in the imagined frictionless economy
translates into a CAPM in net returns for the original economy with illiquidity costs.
Rewriting the one-beta CAPM in net returns in terms of gross returns, we get a
liquidity-adjusted CAPM for gross returns. This is the main testable6 implication of
this paper:
Proposition 1. In the unique linear equilibrium, the conditional expected net return of
security i is
Etðritþ1  citþ1Þ ¼ rf þ lt
covtðritþ1  citþ1; rMtþ1  cMtþ1Þ
vartðrMtþ1  cMtþ1Þ
, (7)
where lt ¼ EtðrMtþ1  cMtþ1  rf Þ is the risk premium. Equivalently, the conditional
expected gross return is
Etðritþ1Þ ¼ rf þ Etðcitþ1Þ þ lt
covtðritþ1; rMtþ1Þ
vartðrMtþ1  cMtþ1Þ
þ lt
covtðcitþ1; cMtþ1Þ
vartðrMtþ1  cMtþ1Þ
 lt
covtðritþ1; cMtþ1Þ
vartðrMtþ1  cMtþ1Þ
 lt
covtðcitþ1; rMtþ1Þ
vartðrMtþ1  cMtþ1Þ
. ð8Þ
Eq. (8) is simple and natural. It states that the required excess return is the expected
relative illiquidity cost, Etðcitþ1Þ; as found theoretically and empirically7 by Amihud
and Mendelson (1986)), plus four betas (or covariances) times the risk premium.
These four betas depend on the asset’s payoff and liquidity risks. As in the standard
CAPM, the required return on an asset increases linearly with the market beta, that
is, covariance between the asset’s return and the market return. This model yields
three additional effects which could be regarded as three forms of liquidity risks.6Difficulties in testing this model arise from the fact that it makes predictions concerning conditional
moments as is standard in asset pricing. See Hansen and Richard (1987), Cochrane (2001), and references
therein. An unconditional version of (8) applies under stronger assumptions as discussed in Section 3.3.
7Empirically, Amihud and Mendelson (1986, 1989) find the required rate of return on NYSE stocks to
increase with the relative bid-ask spread. This result is questioned for NYSE stocks by Eleswarapu and
Reinganum (1993), but supported for NYSE stocks (especially for amortized spreads) by Chalmers and
Kadlec (1998), and for Nasdaq stocks by Eleswarapu (1997). Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen (2004) show
theoretically that adverse-selection costs are priced only to the extent that they render allocations
inefficient. The ability of a market to allocate assets efficiently may be related to market depth, and,
consistent with this view, the required rate of return has been found to decrease with measures of depth
(Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1996; Amihud, 2002). Easley et al. (2002) find returns to increase with a
measure of the probability of informed trading.
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1. covtðcitþ1; cMtþ1Þ: The first effect is that the return increases with the covariance
between the asset’s illiquidity and the market illiquidity. This is because investors want
to be compensated for holding a security that becomes illiquid when the market in
general becomes illiquid. The potential empirical significance of this pricing
implication follows from the presence of a time-varying common factor in liquidity,
which is documented by Chordia et al. (2000), Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001), and
Huberman and Halka (1999). These papers find that most stocks’ illiquidities are
positively related to market illiquidity, so the required return should be raised by the
commonality-in-liquidity effect. The effect of commonality in liquidity on asset prices
is not studied, however, by these authors; we study this effect empirically in Section 4.
In this model, the risk premium associated with commonality in liquidity is caused
by the wealth effects of illiquidity. Also, this risk premium would potentially apply in
an economy in which investors can choose which securities to sell. In such a model,
an investor who holds a security that becomes illiquid (that is, has a high cost cit) can
choose to not trade this security and instead trade other (similar) securities. It is
more likely that an investor can trade other (similar) securities, at low cost, if the
liquidity of this asset does not co-move with the market liquidity. Hence, investors
would require a return premium for assets with positive covariance between
individual and market illiquidity.
2. covtðritþ1; cMtþ1Þ: The second effect on expected returns is due to covariation
between a security’s return and the market liquidity. We see that covtðritþ1; cMtþ1Þ
affects required returns negatively because investors are willing to accept a lower
return on an asset with a high return in times of market illiquidity. Related effects
also arise in the theoretical models of Holmstrom and Tirole (2000), who examine
implications of corporate demand for liquidity, and Lustig (2001), who studies the
equilibrium implications of solvency constraints. Empirical support for this effect is
provided by Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), who find that ‘‘the average return on
stocks with high sensitivities to [market] liquidity exceeds that for stocks with low
sensitivities by 7.5% annually, adjusted for exposures to the market return as well as
size, value, and momentum factors.’’ Sadka (2002) and Wang (2002) also present
consistent evidence for this effect using alternative measures of liquidity.
3. covtðcitþ1; rMtþ1Þ: The third effect on required returns is due to covariation
between a security’s illiquidity and the market return. This effect stems from the
willingness of investors to accept a lower expected return on a security that is liquid
in a down market. When the market declines, investors are poor and the ability to
sell easily is especially valuable. Hence, an investor is willing to accept a discounted
return on stocks with low illiquidity costs in states of poor market return. We find
consistent evidence for this liquidity risk in the stock market in Section 4, and the
effect seems economically important. Also, anecdotal evidence8 suggests that private8For example, the Institute for Fiduciary Education (2002) characterizes private equity as an ‘‘illiquid
asset class’’ and points out that ‘‘In down equity markets, exits are more difficult and little cash is
returned.’’ Source: http://www.ifecorp.com/Papers-PDFs/Wender1102.PDF.
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explain the high average return documented by Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003).
Outside our model, intuition suggests that a low market return causes wealth
problems for some investors, who then need to sell. If a selling investor holds
securities that are illiquid at this time, then his problems are magnified. Consistent
with this intuition, Lynch and Tan (2003) find that the liquidity premium is large if
the transaction costs covary negatively with wealth shocks, among other conditions.
This is consistent with our effect of covtðcitþ1; rMtþ1Þ to the extent that rM proxies for
wealth shocks. Lynch and Tan (2003) complement our paper by showing through
calibration that, even if an investor chooses his holding period endogenously, the
liquidity premium can be large (3.55% in one calibration). They follow
Constantinides (1986) in using a partial-equilibrium framework and defining the
liquidity premium as the decrease in expected return that makes an investor
indifferent between having access to the asset without transaction costs and the asset
with transaction costs.
The three covariances thus provide a characterization of the liquidity risk of a
security. We note that all these covariances can be accounted for by simply using the
conditional CAPM in net returns as in (7). It is useful, however, to use gross returns
and illiquidity as the basic inputs for several reasons: First, computing the net return is
not straightforward since it depends on the investor’s holding period, and the holding
period may be different from the econometrician’s sampling period. We explain in
Section 4 how we overcome this problem. Second, the empirical liquidity literature is
based on measures of gross return and illiquidity costs, and the model provides a
theoretical foundation for the empirical relations between these security character-
istics. Third, a pricing relation for gross returns and illiquidity, which is similar in spirit
to (8), may hold in richer models in which net returns are not sufficient state variables.
As argued above, additional liquidity effects outside the model suggest risk premia of
the same sign for the covariance terms in (8). These additional liquidity effects also
suggest that the size of the risk premia need not be identical across the covariance
terms. To accommodate the possibility of a richer liquidity framework, we also
consider a generalization of (8) in our empirical work in Section 4.
3.2. Implications of persistence of liquidity
This section shows that persistence of liquidity implies that liquidity predicts
future returns and co-moves with contemporaneous returns.
Empirically, liquidity is time-varying and persistent, that is, rC40 (Amihud, 2002;
Chordia et al., 2000, 2001a,b; Hasbrouck and Seppi, 2001; Huberman and Halka,
1999; Jones, 2001; Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003). This model shows that persistent
liquidity implies that returns are predictable. Intuitively, high illiquidity today
predicts high expected illiquidity next period, implying a high required return. The
following proposition makes this intuition precise for a portfolio q 2 RI : We use the
obvious notation for portfolio dividend D
q
t ¼ q>Dt; return rqt ¼
P
i
qiðDitþPitÞP
i
qiPit1
; and
so on.
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D
q
tþ1Þ4rCPqt : Then, the conditional expected return increases with illiquidity,
q
qCqt
Etðrqtþ1  rf Þ40. (9)
Proposition 2 relies on a mild technical condition, which is satisfied, for instance, for
any portfolio with positive price and with EtðPqtþ1 þ Dqtþ1Þ=PqtX1: The proposition
states that the conditional expected return depends positively on the current
illiquidity cost, that is, the current liquidity predicts the return.
Jones (2001) finds empirically that the expected annual stock market return
increases with the previous year’s bid-ask spread and decreases with the previous
year’s turnover. Amihud (2002) finds that illiquidity predicts excess return both for
the market and for size-based portfolios, and Bekaert et al. (2003) find that illiquidity
predicts returns in emerging markets.
Predictability of liquidity further implies a negative conditional covariance
between contemporaneous returns and illiquidity. Naturally, when illiquidity is high,
the required return is high also, which depresses the current price, leading to a low
return. This intuition applies as long as liquidity is persistent (rC40) and
innovations in dividends and illiquidity are not too correlated (q>SCDq low for a
portfolio q), as is formalized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Suppose q 2 RI is a portfolio such that rCðrf q>SCDq þ ðrf 
rDÞq>SCqÞ4ðrf Þ2 q>SCDq: Then, returns are low when illiquidity increases,
covtðcqtþ1; rqtþ1Þo0. (10)
Consistent with this result, Chordia et al. (2001a), Jones (2001), and Pastor and
Stambaugh (2003) find a negative relation between the market return and measures of
market illiquidity, Amihud (2002) finds a negative relation between the return on size
portfolios and their corresponding unexpected illiquidity, and Bekaert et al. (2003) find
a negative relationship between illiquidity and returns for emerging markets.
3.3. An unconditional liquidity-adjusted CAPM
To estimate the liquidity-adjusted CAPM, we derive an unconditional version. An
unconditional result obtains, for instance, under the assumption of independence
over time of dividends and illiquidity costs. Empirically, however, illiquidity is
persistent. Therefore, we rely instead on an assumption of constant conditional
covariances of innovations in illiquidity and returns.9 This assumption yields the9Alternatively, the same unconditional model can be derived by assuming a constant risk premium l and
using the fact that for any random variables X and Y, it holds that
EðcovtðX ; Y ÞÞ ¼ covðX  EtðX Þ; Y Þ ¼ covðX  EtðX Þ; Y  EtðY ÞÞ. (11)
We note that the possible time-variation of risk premium is driven by constant absolute risk aversion in
our model, but with constant relative risk aversion the risk premium is approximately constant. See Friend
and Blume (1975).
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Eðrit  rft Þ ¼ EðcitÞ þ lb1i þ lb2i  lb3i  lb4i, (12)
where
b1i ¼ covðr
i
t; r
M
t  Et1ðrMt ÞÞ
varðrMt  Et1ðrMt Þ  ½cMt  Et1ðcMt ÞÞ
, ð13Þ
b2i ¼ covðc
i
t  Et1ðcitÞ; cMt  Et1ðcMt ÞÞ
varðrMt  Et1ðrMt Þ  ½cMt  Et1ðcMt ÞÞ
, ð14Þ
b3i ¼ covðr
i
t; c
M
t  Et1ðcMt ÞÞ
varðrMt  Et1ðrMt Þ  ½cMt  Et1ðcMt ÞÞ
, ð15Þ
b4i ¼ covðc
i
t  Et1ðcitÞ; rMt  Et1ðrMt ÞÞ
varðrMt  Et1ðrMt Þ  ½cMt  Et1ðcMt ÞÞ
, ð16Þ
and l ¼ EðltÞ ¼ EðrMt  cMt  rf Þ: Next, we describe the empirical tests of this
unconditional relation.4. Empirical results
In this section, we estimate and test the liquidity-adjusted CAPM as specified in
Equation (12). We do this in five steps:(i) We estimate, in each month t of our sample, a measure of illiquidity, cit; for each
individual security i. (Section 4.1).(ii) We form a ‘‘market portfolio’’ and sets of 25 test portfolios sorted on the basis
of illiquidity, illiquidity variation, size, and book-to-market by size, respectively.
We compute the return and illiquidity for each portfolio in each month (Section
4.2).(iii) For the market portfolio as well as the test portfolios, we estimate the
innovations in illiquidity, c
p
t  Et1ðcpt Þ (Section 4.3).(iv) Using these illiquidity innovations and returns, we estimate and analyze the
liquidity betas (Section 4.4).(v) Finally, we consider the empirical fit of the (unconditional) liquidity-adjusted
CAPM by running cross-sectional regressions. To check the robustness of our
results, we do the analysis with a number of different specifications (Section 4.5).4.1. The illiquidity measure
Liquidity is (unfortunately) not an observable variable. There exist, however,
many proxies for liquidity. Some proxies, such as the bid-ask spread, are based on
market microstructure data, which is not available for a time series as long as is
usually desirable for studying the effect on expected returns. Further, the bid-ask
spread measures well the cost of selling a small number of shares, but it does not
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estimating illiquidity using only daily data from the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP). In particular, Amihud (2002) defines the illiquidity of stock i in
month t as
ILLIQit ¼
1
Daysit
XDaysit
d¼1
jRitd j
Vitd
, (17)
where Ritd and V
i
td are, respectively, the return and dollar volume (in millions) on day
d in month t, and Daysit is the number of valid observation days in month t for
stock i.
The intuition behind this illiquidity measure is as follows. A stock is illiquid—that
is, has a high value of ILLIQit—if the stock’s price moves a lot in response to little
volume. In our model, illiquidity is the cost of selling and, as discussed in Section 2,
real markets have several different selling costs including broker fees, bid-ask
spreads, market impact, and search costs. Our empirical strategy is based on an
assumption that ILLIQ is a valid instrument for the costs of selling, broadly
interpreted. Consistent with this view, Amihud (2002) shows empirically that ILLIQ
is positively related to measures of price impact and fixed trading costs over the time
period in which he has the microstructure data. Similarly, Hasbrouck (2002)
computes a measure of Kyle’s lambda using microstructure data for NYSE, AMEX,
and NASDAQ stocks, and finds that its Spearman (Pearson) correlation with ILLIQ
in the cross-section of stocks is 0.737 (0.473). Hasbrouck (2002) concludes that
‘‘[a]mong the proxies considered here, the illiquidity measure ½ILLIQ appears to be
the best.’’ Furthermore, ILLIQ is closely related to the Amivest measure of
illiquidity, which has often been used in the empirical microstructure literature.
There are two problems with using ILLIQ: First, it is measured in ‘‘percent per
dollar,’’ whereas the model is specified in terms of ‘‘dollar cost per dollar invested.’’
This is a problem because it means that ILLIQ is not stationary (e.g., inflation is
ignored). Second, while ILLIQ is an instrument for the cost of selling, it does not
directly measure the cost of a trade. To solve these problems, we define a normalized
measure of illiquidity, cit; by
cit ¼ minð0:25þ 0:30ILLIQitPMt1; 30:00Þ, (18)
where PMt1 is the ratio of the capitalizations of the market portfolio at the end of
month t  1 and of the market portfolio at the end of July 1962. The PMt1 adjustment
solves the first problem mentioned above, and it makes this measure of illiquidity
relatively stationary. The coefficients 0.25 and 0.30 are chosen such that the cross-
sectional distribution of normalized illiquidity (cit) for size-decile portfolios has
approximately the same level and variance as does the effective half spread—i.e. the
difference between the transaction price and the midpoint of the prevailing bid-ask
quote—reported by Chalmers and Kadlec (1998), Table 1. This normalized
illiquidity is capped at a maximum value of 30% in order to ensure that our results
are not driven by the extreme observations of ILLIQit: Furthermore, a per-trade cost
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days on ILLIQit:
Chalmers and Kadlec (1998) report that the mean effective spread for size-decile
portfolios of NYSE and AMEX stocks over the period 1983–1992 ranges from
0.29% to 3.41% with an average of 1.11%. The normalized illiquidity, cit; for
identically formed portfolios has an average of 1.24%, a standard deviation of
0.37%, and matches the range as well as the cross-sectional variation reported by
Chalmers and Kadlec (1998). This means that we can interpret the illiquidity
measure cit as directly related to (a lower bound of) the per-trade cost.
Admittedly, this is a noisy measure of illiquidity. This makes it harder for us to
find an empirical connection between return and illiquidity, and it can enhance
omitted-variable problems. The noise is reduced by considering portfolios rather
than individual stocks.4.2. Portfolios
We employ daily return and volume data from CRSP from July 1st, 1962 until
December 31st, 1999 for all common shares listed on NYSE and AMEX. To keep
our liquidity measure consistent across stocks, we do not include Nasdaq since the
volume data includes interdealer trades (and only starts in 1982). Also, we use book-
to-market data based on the COMPUSTAT measure of book value.10
We form a market portfolio for each month t during this sample period based on
stocks with beginning-of-month price between $5 and $1000, and with at least 15
days of return and volume data in that month.
We form 25 illiquidity portfolios for each year y during the period 1964 to 1999 by
sorting stocks with price, at the beginning of the year, between $5 and $1000, and
return and volume data in year y  1 for at least 100 days.11 We compute the annual
illiquidity for each eligible stock as the average over the entire year y  1 of daily
illiquidities, analogously to the monthly illiquidity calculation in (17). The eligible
stocks are then sorted into 25 portfolios, p 2 f1; 2; . . . ; 25g; based on their year y  1
illiquidities.
Similarly, we form 25 illiquidity-variation portfolios (denoted ‘‘s(illiquidity)
portfolios’’) by ranking the eligible stocks each year based on the standard
deviation of daily illiquidity measures in the previous year, and 25 size portfolios
by ranking stocks based on their market capitalization at the beginning of
the year.10We are grateful to Joe Chen for providing us with data on book-to-market ratios. The book-to-market
ratios are computed as described in Ang and Chen (2002): [For a given month] the book-to-market ratio is
calculated using the most recently available fiscal year-end balance sheet data on COMPUSTAT.
Following Fama and French (1993), we define ‘‘book value’’ as the value of common stockholders’ equity,
plus deferred taxes and investment tax credit, minus the book value of preferred stock. The book value is
then divided by the market value on the day of the firm’s fiscal year-end.
11Amihud (2002) and Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) employ similar requirements for the inclusion of
stocks in their samples. These requirements help reduce the measurement error in the monthly illiquidity
series.
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into five size quintiles within the book-to-market groups. This sample is restricted to
stocks with book-to-market data in year y  1: When considering the portfolio
properties, we use the year-y book-to-market, averaging across stocks with available
book-to-market data in that year.
For each portfolio p (including the market portfolio), we compute its return in
month t as
r
p
t ¼
X
i in p
w
ip
t r
i
t, (19)
where the sum is taken over the stocks included in portfolio p in month t, and where
w
ip
t are either equal weights or value-based weights, depending on the specification.
12
Similarly, we compute the normalized illiquidity of a portfolio, p, as
c
p
t ¼
X
i in p
w
ip
t c
i
t, (20)
where, as above, w
ip
t are either equal weights or value-based weights, depending on
the specification.
The model’s results are phrased in terms of value-weighted returns and value-
weighted illiquidity for the market portfolio. Several studies, however, focus on
equal-weighted return and illiquidity measures, for instance Amihud (2002) and
Chordia et al. (2000). Computing the market return and illiquidity as equal-weighted
averages is a way of compensating for the over-representation in our sample of large
liquid securities, as compared to the ‘‘true’’ market portfolio in the economy. In
particular, our sample does not include illiquid assets such as corporate bonds,
private equity, real estate, and many small stocks, and these assets constitute a
significant fraction of aggregate wealth. In particular, Heaton and Lucas (2000)
report that stocks constitute only 13.6% of national wealth, while noncorporate (i.e.
private) equity is 13.8%, other financial wealth is 28.2%, owner-occupied real estate
is 33.3%, and consumer durables is 11.1%. Therefore, we focus in our empirical
work on an equal-weighted market portfolio, although we also estimate the model
with a value-weighted market portfolio for robustness. Also, we use both equal- and
value-weighted averages for the test portfolios.
4.3. Innovations in illiquidity
Illiquidity is persistent. The autocorrelation of the market illiquidity, for instance,
is 0:87 at a monthly frequency. Therefore, we focus on the innovations, cpt  Et1ðcpt Þ;12The returns, rit; are adjusted for stock delisting to avoid survivorship bias, following Shumway (1997).
In particular, the last return used is either the last return available on CRSP, or the delisting return, if
available. While a last return for the stock of 100% is naturally included in the study, a return of 30%
is assigned if the deletion reason is coded in CRSP as 500 (reason unavailable), 520 (went to OTC),
551–573 and 580 (various reasons), 574 (bankruptcy), and 584 (does not meet exchange financial
guidelines). Shumway (1997) obtains that 30% is the average delisting return, examining the OTC
returns of delisted stocks.
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Section 3.3.
To compute these innovations, we first define the un-normalized illiquidity,
truncated for outliers, of a portfolio p as
ILLIQ
p
t :¼
X
i in p
w
ip
t min ILLIQ
i
t;
30:00 0:25
0:30PMt1
 
, (21)
where w
ip
t is the portfolio weight. As explained in Section 4.1, we normalize illiquidity
to make it stationary and to put it on a scale corresponding to the cost of a single
trade.
To predict market illiquidity, we run the following regression:
ð0:25þ 0:30ILLIQMt PMt1Þ ¼ a0 þ a1ð0:25þ 0:30ILLIQ
M
t1P
M
t1Þ
þ a2ð0:25þ 0:30ILLIQMt2PMt1Þ
þ ut. ð22Þ
Note that the three terms inside parentheses in this specification correspond closely
to cMt ; c
M
t1; and c
M
t2; respectively, as given by (18) and (20), with the difference that
the same date is used for the market index (PMt1) in all three terms. This is to ensure
that we are measuring innovations only in illiquidity, not changes in PM : Our results
are robust to the specification of liquidity innovations and, in particular, employing
other stock-market variables available at time t  1 does not improve significantly
the explanatory power of the regression. Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) employ a
specification to compute market liquidity innovations that is similar in spirit to the
AR(2) specification in (22).
The residual, u, of the regression in (22) is interpreted as the market illiquidity
innovation, cMt  Et1ðcMt Þ; that is,
cMt  Et1ðcMt Þ:¼ut, (23)
and innovations in portfolio illiquidity are computed in the same way using the same
AR coefficients.
For the market illiquidity series, the AR(2) specification has a R2 of 78%. The
resulting innovations in market illiquidity, cMt  Et1ðcMt Þ; have a standard deviation
of 0:17%: Fig. 1 plots the time series of these innovations, scaled to have unit
standard deviation. The autocorrelation of these illiquidity innovations is low
(0:03) and, visually, they appear stationary. Employing an AR(1) specification
produces a significantly greater correlation of innovations (0:29), whereas
employing an AR(3) specification produces little improvement in the explanatory
power.
The measured innovations in market illiquidity are high during periods that
anecdotally were characterized by liquidity crisis, for instance, in 5/1970 (Penn
Central commercial paper crisis), 11/1973 (oil crisis), 10/1987 (stock market crash),
8/1990 (Iraqi invasion of Kuwait), 4,12/1997 (Asian crisis), and 6–10/1998 (Russian
default and Long Term Capital Management crisis). The correlation between this
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Fig. 1. Standardized innovations in market illiquidity from 1964–1999.
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liquidity used by Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) is 0:33:13 (The negative sign is due
to the fact that Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) measure liquidity, whereas we follow
Amihud (2002) in considering illiquidity.)
4.4. Liquidity risk
In this section, we present the descriptive statistics of liquidity risk, measured by
the betas b2p; b3p; and b4p: We focus on the value-weighted illiquidity portfolios
whose properties are reported in Table 1. Similar conclusions are drawn from
examining the properties of equal-weighted illiquidity portfolios or size portfolios
(not reported). The four betas, b1p; b2p; b3p; and b4p; for each portfolio are computed
as per Eqs. (13)–(16) using the entire monthly time-series 1964 to 1999, where the
illiquidity innovations are computed as described in Section 4.3 and the innovations
in market portfolio returns are computed using an AR(2) that also employs available
market characteristics at the beginning of the month (return, volatility, average
illiquidity, log of average dollar volume, log of average turnover, all measured over
the past six months, and log of one-month lagged market capitalization).
Table 1 shows that the sort on past illiquidity successfully produces portfolios with
monotonically increasing average illiquidity from portfolio 1 through portfolio 25.
Not surprisingly, we see that illiquid stocks—that is, stocks with high average
illiquidity EðcpÞ—tend to have a high volatility of stock returns, a low turnover, and13We thank Pastor and Stambaugh for providing their data on innovations in market liquidity.
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Table 1
Properties of illiquidity portfolios
This table reports the properties of the odd-numbered portfolios of 25 value-weighted illiquidity
portfolios formed each year during 1964–1999. The market beta ðb1pÞ and the liquidity betas (b2p; b3p; and
b4p) are computed using all monthly return and illiquidity observations for each portfolio and for an
equal-weighted market portfolio; t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The standard deviation of a
portfolio’s illiquidity innovations is reported under the column of sðDcpÞ: The average illiquidity, EðcpÞ;
the average excess return, Eðre;pÞ; the turnover (trn), the market capitalization (size), and book-to-market
(BM) are computed for each portfolio as time-series averages of the respective monthly characteristics.
Finally, sðrpÞ is the average of the standard deviation of daily returns for the portfolio’s constituent stocks
computed each month.
b1p b2p b3p b4p EðcpÞ sðDcpÞ Eðre;pÞ sðrpÞ trn Size BM
(100) (100) (100) (100) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (bl$)
1 55.10 0.00 0.80 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.48 1.43 3.25 12.50 0.53
(14.54) (0.08) (5.90) (0.10)
3 67.70 0.00 1.05 0.03 0.26 0.00 0.39 1.64 4.19 2.26 0.72
(16.32) (0.58) (7.14) (0.62)
5 74.67 0.00 1.24 0.07 0.27 0.01 0.60 1.74 4.17 1.20 0.71
(20.44) (1.27) (7.43) (1.36)
7 76.25 0.00 1.27 0.10 0.29 0.01 0.57 1.83 4.14 0.74 0.73
(20.63) (2.18) (7.49) (2.03)
9 81.93 0.01 1.37 0.18 0.32 0.02 0.71 1.86 3.82 0.48 0.73
(33.25) (3.79) (8.00) (3.74)
11 84.59 0.01 1.41 0.33 0.36 0.04 0.73 1.94 3.87 0.33 0.76
(34.21) (5.07) (7.94) (5.85)
13 85.29 0.01 1.47 0.40 0.43 0.05 0.77 1.99 3.47 0.24 0.77
(34.15) (6.84) (8.01) (7.46)
15 88.99 0.02 1.61 0.70 0.53 0.08 0.85 2.04 3.20 0.17 0.83
(42.88) (6.87) (8.35) (8.45)
17 87.89 0.04 1.59 0.98 0.71 0.13 0.80 2.11 2.96 0.13 0.88
(27.54) (8.16) (8.18) (9.30)
19 87.50 0.05 1.58 1.53 1.01 0.21 0.83 2.13 2.68 0.09 0.92
(40.74) (7.63) (8.75) (8.77)
21 92.73 0.09 1.69 2.10 1.61 0.34 1.13 2.28 2.97 0.06 0.99
(37.85) (7.33) (8.34) (6.11)
23 94.76 0.19 1.71 3.35 3.02 0.62 1.12 2.57 2.75 0.04 1.09
(39.71) (6.85) (8.68) (5.91)
25 84.54 0.42 1.69 4.52 8.83 1.46 1.10 2.87 2.60 0.02 1.15
(20.86) (6.40) (8.23) (3.35)
V.V. Acharya, L.H. Pedersen / Journal of Financial Economics 77 (2005) 375–410 391a small market capitalization. Furthermore, we find that illiquid stocks also have
high liquidity risk—they have large values of b2p and large negative values of b3p and
b4p: In other words, a stock, which is illiquid in absolute terms (cp), also tends to
have a lot of commonality in liquidity with the market (covðcp; cM Þ), a lot of return
sensitivity to market liquidity (covðrp; cMÞ), and a lot of liquidity sensitivity to market
returns (covðcp; rMÞ). This result is interesting on its own since it is consistent with the
notion of flight to liquidity. We note that all of the betas are estimated with a small
error (i.e., a small asymptotic variance). Indeed, almost all of the betas are
statistically significant at conventional levels.
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respective arguments and their standard deviations. As noted before, more illiquid
stocks have greater volatility of returns. Furthermore, since illiquidity is bounded
below by zero, it is natural that more illiquid stocks also have more volatile
illiquidity innovations. This is verified in Table 1 which shows that the standard
deviation of portfolio illiquidity innovations, sðDcpÞ; increases monotonically in
portfolio illiquidity. However, the higher variability of returns and illiquidity
innovations are not the sole drivers of the positive relation between illiquidity and
liquidity risk. The correlation coefficients between cp and cM (rp and cM) are also
increasing (decreasing) in portfolio illiquidity. The correlation coefficients between cp
and rM are decreasing in illiquidity between portfolios 1–15 and are gradually
increasing thereafter. Nevertheless, the variability of cp ensures that the covariances
between cp and rM are decreasing in illiquidity. (These correlations are not reported
in the table for sake of brevity.)
The collinearity of measures of liquidity risk is confirmed by considering the
correlation among the betas, reported in Table 2. The collinearity problem is not just
a property of the liquidity-sorted portfolios; it also exists at an individual stock level
as is seen in Table 3. The collinearity at the stock level is smaller, which could be due
in part to larger estimation errors. While this collinearity is theoretically intriguing, it
makes it hard to empirically distinguish the separate effects of illiquidity and the
individual liquidity betas.
4.5. How liquidity risk affects returns
In this section, we study how liquidity risk affects expected returns. We do this by
running cross-sectional regressions on our test portfolios using a GMM framework
that takes into account the pre-estimation of the betas (as in Cochrane, 2001).
Standard errors are computed using the Newey and West (1987) method with two
lags. Our point estimates are the same as those derived using OLS (either in a pooled
regression or using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) method), and our standard errors
correspond to those of Shanken (1992) except that the GMM method also takes
serial correlation into account.
Illiquidity and s (illiquidity) portfolios. The potential effect of liquidity and
liquidity risk is, of course, detected by considering portfolios that differ in their
liquidity attributes. Hence, we consider first the liquidity-adjusted CAPM (12) for
portfolios sorted by illiquidity and the illiquidity variation.
To impose the model-implied constraint that the risk premia of the different betas
is the same, we define the ‘‘net beta’’ as
bnet;p:¼b1p þ b2p  b3p  b4p. (24)
With this definition, the liquidity-adjusted CAPM becomes
Eðrpt  rft Þ ¼ aþ kEðcpt Þ þ lbnet;p; ð25Þ
where we allow a nonzero intercept, a; in the estimation, although the model implies
that the intercept is zero. Also, in our model k ¼ 1: This is because investors incur
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Table 3
Beta correlations for individual stocks
This table reports the correlations of b1i ; b2i ; b3i; and b4i for the common shares listed on NYSE and
AMEX during the period 1964–1999. The correlations are computed annually for all eligible stocks in a
year and then averaged over the sample period. The four betas are computed for each stock using all
monthly return and illiquidity observations for the stock and the market portfolio.
b1i b2i b3i b4i
b1i 1.000 0.020 0.685 0.164
b2i 1.000 0.072 0.270
b3i 1.000 0.192
b4i 1.000
Table 2
Beta correlations for illiquidity portfolios
This table reports the correlations of b1p; b2p; b3p; and b4p for the 25 value-weighted illiquidity portfolios
formed for each year during 1964–1999.
b1p b2p b3p b4p
b1p 1.000 0.441 0.972 0.628
b2p 1.000 0.573 0.941
b3p 1.000 0.726
b4p 1.000
V.V. Acharya, L.H. Pedersen / Journal of Financial Economics 77 (2005) 375–410 393the illiquidity cost exactly once each model period. Our monthly estimation period is,
however, different from a typical investor’s holding period—the period implicitly
considered in the model. When the estimation period is k times the holding period,
then the estimated Eðrpt  rft Þ is approximately k times the expected holding period
return, and the estimated bnet;p is assumed to be approximately k times the holding-
period net beta. This is because a k-period return (or illiquidity innovation) is
approximately a sum of k one-period returns (or illiquidity innovations), and
because returns and illiquidity innovations have low correlation across time. The
illiquidity, EðcpÞ; however, does not scale with time period because it is an average of
daily illiquidities (not a sum of such terms). Therefore, the EðcpÞ term is scaled by k
in (25) to adjust for the difference between estimation periods and holding periods.
The average holding period is proxied empirically by the period over which all
shares are turned over once. Hence, we calibrate k as the average monthly turnover
across all stocks in the sample. In the sample of liquidity portfolios, k is calibrated to
0.034, which corresponds to a holding period of 1=0:034 ffi 29 months. The expected
illiquidity, Eðcpt Þ; is computed as the portfolio’s average illiquidity. To run the
regression (25) with a fixed k; we treat the net return, Eðrpt  rft Þ  kEðcpt Þ; as the
dependent variable. However, all R2 are based on the same dependent variable,
namely, Eðrpt  rft Þ: Note that the structure of the liquidity-adjusted CAPM and the
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regression study in which the asset-pricing relationship is backed out from the return
series and data on security characteristics such as beta, size, book-to-market, etc.
The liquidity-adjusted CAPM (25) has only one risk premium, l; that needs to be
estimated as in the standard CAPM. Here, the risk factor is the net beta instead of
the standard market beta. Hence, the empirical improvement in fit relative to the
standard CAPM is not achieved by adding factors (or otherwise adding degrees of
freedom), but simply by making a liquidity adjustment.
The estimated results for Eq. (25) are reported in line 1 of Table 4, with illiquidity
portfolios in Panel A and s (illiquidity) portfolios in Panel B. With either portfolio,
the risk premium l is positive and significant at a 1% level and a is insignificant, both
results lending support to our model. The R2 of the liquidity-adjusted CAPM is high
relative to the standard CAPM, reported in line 3. In line 2, we estimate the liquidity-
adjusted CAPM with k as a free parameter, which results in only modest changes in
k and l:
While the improvement in fit of the liquidity-adjusted CAPM over the CAPM is
encouraging, it does not constitute a test of the effect of liquidity risk. To isolate the
effect of liquidity risk (b2; b3; and b4) over liquidity level (EðcÞ) and market risk (b1),
we consider the relation
Eðrpt  rft Þ ¼ aþ kEðcpt Þ þ l1b1p þ lbnet;p: ð26Þ
In line 4, this relation is estimated with k at its calibrated value. We see that bnet is
insignificant for illiquidity portfolios, but significant for s (illiquidity) portfolios. In
line 5, the relation is estimated with k as a free parameter. In this regression, the
support for the model is stronger in that bnet is significant with either portfolio. We
note that k is estimated to be negative in Panel A, although it is statistically
insignificant. Since the model implies that k should be positive, we estimate in line 6
with the restriction that k ¼ 0: With this specification, bnet remains significant in
both panels. In conclusion, there is some evidence that liquidity risk matters over
and above market risk and liquidity level. The collinearity problems imply, however,
that this evidence is weak.
We note that a negative coefficient on b1 does not imply a negative risk premium
on market risk since b1 is also contained in bnet: Rather, a negative coefficient
suggests that liquidity risk may have a higher risk premium than market risk. For
instance, line 4 of Table 4A means that
Eðrpt  rft Þ ¼  0:333þ 0:034Eðcpt Þ  3:181b1p þ 4:334bnet;p
¼  0:333þ 0:034Eðcpt Þ þ 1:153b1p þ 4:334ðb2p  b3p  b4pÞ. ð27Þ
Finally, in line 7 we allow all of the betas to have different risk premia li; and in line 8
we further let k be a free parameter. That is, lines 7–8 estimate the generalized relation
Eðrpt  rft Þ ¼ aþ kEðcpt Þ þ l1b1p þ l2b2p þ l3b3p þ l4b4p (28)
without the model restrictions that l1 ¼ l2 ¼ l3 ¼ l4: We see that the multi-
collinearity problems are severe, and, hence, statistical identification of the separate
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Table 4
Illiquidity and s (illiquidity) portfolios
This table reports the estimated coefficients from cross-sectional regressions of the liquidity-adjusted
CAPM for 25 value-weighted portfolios using monthly data during 1964–1999 with an equal-weighted
market portfolio. We consider special cases of the relation
Eðrpt  rft Þ ¼ aþ kEðcpt Þ þ l1b1p þ l2b2p þ l3b3p þ l4b4p þ lbnet;p,
where bnet;p ¼ b1p þ b2p  b3p  b4p: In some specifications, k is set to be the average monthly turnover.
The t-statistic, reported in the parentheses, is estimated using a GMM framework that takes into account
the pre-estimation of the betas. The R2 is obtained in a single cross-sectional regression, and the adjusted
R2 is reported in parentheses.
Constant EðcpÞ b1p b2p b3p b4p bnet;p R2
Panel A: illiquidity portfolios
1 0.556 0.034 1.512 0.732
(1.450) (—) (2.806) (0.732)
2 0.512 0.042 1.449 0.825
(1.482) (2.210) (2.532) (0.809)
3 0.788 1.891 0.653
(1.910) (3.198) (0.638)
4 0.333 0.034 3.181 4.334 0.843
(0.913) (—) (0.998) (1.102) (0.836)
5 0.005 0.032 13.223 13.767 0.878
(0.013) (0.806) (1.969) (2.080) (0.861)
6 0.160 8.322 9.164 0.870
(0.447) (2.681) (3.016) (0.858)
7 0.089 0.034 0.992 153.369 7.112 17.583 0.881
(0.219) (—) (0.743) (1.287) (0.402) (1.753) (0.865)
8 0.089 0.033 0.992 151.152 7.087 17.542 0.881
(0.157) (0.166) (0.468) (0.280) (0.086) (1.130) (0.850)
Panel B: s (illiquidity) portfolios
1 0.528 0.035 1.471 0.865
(1.419) (—) (2.817) (0.865)
2 0.363 0.062 1.243 0.886
(1.070) (2.433) (2.240) (0.875)
3 0.827 1.923 0.726
(2.027) (3.322) (0.714)
4 0.014 0.035 7.113 7.772 0.917
(0.037) (—) (1.939) (2.615) (0.914)
5 0.094 0.007 11.013 11.467 0.924
(0.235) (0.158) (2.080) (2.480) (0.914)
6 0.119 11.914 12.320 0.924
(0.305) (2.413) (2.608) (0.917)
7 0.464 0.035 1.105 83.690 74.538 14.560 0.940
(0.913) (—) (0.728) (0.663) (1.175) (1.662) (0.931)
8 0.459 0.148 1.125 390.588 73.552 21.688 0.942
(0.565) (0.140) (0.485) (0.140) (1.943) (0.335) (0.927)
V.V. Acharya, L.H. Pedersen / Journal of Financial Economics 77 (2005) 375–410 395
ARTICLE IN PRESS
V.V. Acharya, L.H. Pedersen / Journal of Financial Economics 77 (2005) 375–410396effects of the different liquidity risks is difficult. Of course, we must also entertain the
possibility that not all of these risk factors are empirically relevant.
The empirical fit of the standard CAPM is illustrated in the top left panel of Fig. 2
for illiquidity portfolios and of Fig. 3 for s (illiquidity) portfolios. The top right and
bottom panels show, respectively, the fit of the constrained and unconstrained
liquidity-adjusted CAPM, that is, lines 1 and 8, respectively, from Table 4. We see
that the liquidity adjustment improves the fit especially for the illiquid portfolios,
consistent with what our intuition would suggest. We note that the number of free
parameters is the same in the top right and top left panels, so the improvement in fit
is not a consequence of more degrees of freedom.
Economic significance of results. It is interesting to consider the economic
significance of liquidity risk. To get a perspective on the magnitude of the effect, we
compute the annual return premium required to hold illiquid rather than liquid
securities. This is computed as the product of the risk premium and the difference in
liquidity risk across liquidity portfolios. If we use the unrestricted model in line 8 of0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2
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Fig. 2. Illiquidity portfolios: the top left panel shows the fitted CAPM returns vs. realized returns using
monthly data 1964–1999 for value-weighted illiquidity portfolios. The top right panel shows the same for
the liquidity-adjusted CAPM, and the lower panel shows the relation for the liquidity-adjusted CAPM
with unconstrained risk premia.
ARTICLE IN PRESS
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
Realized monthly excess return
Fi
tte
d 
m
on
th
ly
 e
xc
es
s r
et
ur
n
CAPM
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
Realized monthly excess return
Fi
tte
d 
m
on
th
ly
 e
xc
es
s r
et
ur
n
Liquidity-adjusted CAPM
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
Realized monthly excess return
Fi
tte
d 
m
on
th
ly
 e
xc
es
s r
et
ur
n
Liquidity-adjusted CAPM, unconstrained risk premia
Fig. 3. s (illiquidity) portfolios: the top left panel shows the fitted CAPM returns vs. realized returns using
monthly data 1964–1999 for value weighted s (illiquidity) portfolios. The top right panel shows the same
for the liquidity-adjusted CAPM, and the lower panel shows the relation for the liquidity-adjusted CAPM
with unconstrained risk premia.
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Instead, the benefit of having an economic model is that we can impose its structure
and can get relatively tight estimates. Hence, we use the calibrated value of k and the
common risk premium, l ¼ 1:512; from line 1. Of course, when interpreting the
results, one must bear in mind that they rely on the validity of the model.
The difference in annualized expected returns between portfolio 1 and 25 that can
be attributed to a difference in b2; the commonality between the portfolio illiquidity
and market illiquidity, is
lðb2;p25  b2;p1 Þ12 ¼ 0:08%. (29)
Similarly, the annualized return difference stemming from the difference in b3; the
sensitivity of the portfolio return to market illiquidity, is
lðb3;p25  b3;p1Þ12 ¼ 0:16%, (30)
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lðb4;p25  b4;p1Þ12 ¼ 0:82%. (31)
The total effect of liquidity risk is therefore 1.1% per year. Using the standard error
of the estimates of l and the betas, the 95% confidence interval for the total effect of
b2  b3  b4 is ½0:24%; 1:88%: Hence, under the model restrictions and using the
calibrated k; the effect of liquidity risk is significantly different from zero.
Interestingly, of the three liquidity risks the effect of b4; the covariation of a
security’s illiquidity to market returns, appears to have the largest economic impact
on expected returns. (Also, it has the highest t-statistics in the unrestricted regression
of lines 7–8 in Table 4). This liquidity risk has not been studied before either
theoretically or empirically.
The difference in annualized expected returns between portfolios 1 and 25 that can
be attributed to a difference in the expected illiquidity, EðcÞ; is 3.5%, using the
calibrated coefficient. The overall effect of expected illiquidity and liquidity risk is
thus 4.6% per year.
While the magnitude of liquidity risk is economically significant, it is lower than
the magnitude estimated by Pastor and Stambaugh (2003). This could be due to the
fact that they employ a different measure of liquidity, or due to the fact that they sort
portfolios based on liquidity risk (in their case, b3) whereas we sort based on the level
of liquidity. Also, this could be because they do not control for the level of illiquidity
which has been shown to command a significant premium in a number of studies
including Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996),
Brennan et al. (1998), Datar et al. (1998), Swan (2002), and Dimson and Hanke
(2002). Finally, the difference could also arise because we restrict the risk premia on
different liquidity betas to be the same. For instance, the magnitude of the risk
premium related to b4 is estimated to be higher in lines 7–8 of Table 4A. This higher
risk premium results in a per-year effect of about 9% from b4 alone.14
The collinearity between liquidity and liquidity risk implies that the most robust
number is their overall effect. Further, our results suggest that studies that focus on
the separate effect of liquidity (or liquidity risk) can possibly be reinterpreted as
providing an estimate of the overall effect of liquidity and liquidity risk.
Robustness, size, and book-to-market. To check the robustness of our results, we
consider different specifications and portfolios. First, we consider whether our
results are robust to the choice of value weighting versus equal weighting. Table 5A
reports the results with equal-weighted illiquidity portfolios and equal-weighted
market, and Table 5B with value-weighted illiquidity portfolios and value-weighted
market. The results and their significance are similar to those of Table 4A. First, bnet
is borderline significant at a 5% level in line 1 of Table 5A, but insignificant at this14In another recent paper, Chordia et al. (2001b) find that expected returns in the cross-section are
higher for stocks with low variability of liquidity, measured using variables such as trading volume and
turnover. They examine the firm-specific variability of liquidity. By contrast, our model and tests suggest
that it is the co-movement of firm-specific liquidity with market return and market liquidity that affects
expected returns.
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Table 5
Illiquidity portfolios: robustness of weighting method
This table reports the estimated coefficients from cross-sectional regressions of the liquidity-adjusted
CAPM for 25 illiquidity portfolios using monthly data during 1964–1999. We consider special cases of the
relation
Eðrpt  rft Þ ¼ aþ kEðcpt Þ þ l1b1p þ l2b2p þ l3b3p þ l4b4p þ lbnet;p,
where bnet;p ¼ b1p þ b2p  b3p  b4p: In some specifications, k is set to be the average monthly turnover.
The t-statistic, reported in the parentheses, is estimated using a GMM framework that takes into account
the pre-estimation of the betas. The R2 is obtained in a single cross-sectional regression, and the adjusted
R2 is reported in parentheses.
Constant EðcpÞ b1p b2p b3p b4p bnet;p R2
Panel A: equal-weighted portfolios, equal-weighted market
1 0.391 0.046 1.115 0.825
(0.889) (—) (1.997) (0.825)
2 0.299 0.062 0.996 0.846
(0.737) (3.878) (4.848) (0.832)
3 0.530 1.374 0.350
(1.082) (2.085) (0.322)
4 0.088 0.046 2.699 3.395 0.879
(0.249) (—) (1.441) (1.782) (0.873)
5 0.105 0.008 6.392 6.800 0.901
(0.296) (0.318) (2.238) (2.427) (0.886)
6 0.143 7.115 7.467 0.900
(0.397) (3.623) (3.871) (0.891)
7 0.132 0.046 1.568 141.416 47.823 12.784 0.911
(0.633) (—) (1.295) (1.032) (0.469) (1.553) (0.898)
8 0.053 0.117 1.207 346.547 33.043 17.356 0.913
(0.060) (0.837) (0.343) (0.796) (0.186) (0.981) (0.890)
Panel B: value-weighted portfolios, value-weighted market
1 1.938 0.034 2.495 0.486
(1.203) (—) (1.627) (0.486)
2 2.059 0.081 2.556 0.642
(1.755) (2.755) (2.107) (0.609)
3 0.700 0.062 0.000
(0.272) (0.025) (0.043)
4 1.536 0.034 6.070 8.099 0.754
(2.033) (—) (1.540) (2.040) (0.743)
5 0.583 0.076 16.226 17.333 0.841
(0.718) (0.902) (2.978) (3.543) (0.819)
6 1.241 9.210 10.954 0.800
(1.271) (2.733) (3.183) (0.781)
7 0.301 0.034 0.363 4494.924 370.840 26.044 0.850
(0.285) (—) (0.268) (1.060) (0.806) (1.366) (0.828)
8 0.039 0.056 0.015 116.450 405.451 13.135 0.865
(0.031) (0.140) (0.007) (0.010) (0.413) (0.270) (0.829)
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than the standard CAPM. In particular, with value-weighted portfolios in Table 5B,
the standard CAPM has an R-square of 0.0%, whereas the liquidity-adjusted CAPM
has an R-square of 48.6%. There is further evidence that liquidity risk matters over
and above liquidity level and market risk. In particular, bnet is significant in line 5 of
Table 5A, and in all of lines 4–6 in Table 5B. (Also, bnet is significant in line 6 of
Table 5A, but this line is not relevant since the coefficient on EðcpÞ has the correct
sign in line 5.)
As a further robustness check, we re-estimate our model with size-based portfolios
and portfolios sorted first into five book-to-market quintiles and then into five size
quintiles within the book-to-market groups.
Small-sized stocks are illiquid (in absolute terms as measured by EðcÞ) and also
have high liquidity risk (as measured by the three betas b2p; b3p; and b4p). Table 6A
shows that the cross-sectional regressions have coefficients that are similar to our
earlier results, but the statistical significance is reduced. The coefficient of bnet is
estimated to be positive and the liquidity-adjusted CAPM still has a higher R2 than
the standard CAPM. Fig. 4 shows graphically the fit for size portfolios of the
standard CAPM, and the liquidity-adjusted CAPM, with constrained and
unconstrained risk premia. We see that the liquidity adjustment improves the fit,
particularly for the smaller size portfolios.
Table 6B and Fig. 5 show the model’s fit of the B/M-by-size portfolios. We recover
the well-known result (see Fama and French, 1992, 1993) that CAPM does
relatively poorly for B/M-by-size portfolios (adjusted R2 ¼ 22:9%) since market
beta is relatively ‘‘flat’’ across these portfolios. The liquidity-adjusted CAPM
in line 1 provides a moderate improvement in the fit (adjusted R2 ¼ 40:6%)
whereas the model with unconstrained risk premia produces a significant
improvement in the fit (adjusted R2 ¼ 73:3%). It should be noted, however, that
the unconstrained specification may be ‘‘over fitted’’ in the sense that some of the
risk premia estimated have an incorrect sign and they are all insignificant. The
negative coefficient on bnet in line 5 suggests that the model is misspecified for these
portfolios.
To further consider the model’s ability to explain the size and book-to-market
effects, we run our regressions while controlling for size and book-to-market
(Table 7). We do this both for illiquidity portfolios (Panel A) and for B/M-by-size
portfolios (Panel B). The results with illiquidity portfolios are similar to the earlier
results, although the standard errors increase because of the additional variables.
The coefficient on bnet is significant in the liquidity-adjusted CAPM of line 1. The
coefficient on size is always insignificant and the coefficient on book-to-market is
insignificant in all specifications except line 2. (Including volatility does not change
the results, and volatility is not significant. These results are not reported.) With
B/M-by-size portfolios (Table 7B), the model performs poorly. Indeed, the
coefficient on bnet is negative, although insignificant, and the coefficient on B/M is
significant in most specifications. To summarize, the results with illiquidity portfolios
suggest that liquidity risk matters while controlling for book to market, while the
results with B/M-by-size portfolios suggest that liquidity risk does not explain the
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Table 6
Size and B/M-by-size portfolios
This table reports the estimated coefficients from cross-sectional regressions of the liquidity-adjusted
CAPM for 25 value-weighted size and B/M-by-size portfolios using monthly data during 1964–1999 with
an equal-weighted market portfolio. We consider special cases of the relation
Eðrpt  rft Þ ¼ aþ kEðcpt Þ þ l1b1p þ l2b2p þ l3b3p þ l4b4p þ lbnet;p,
where bnet;p ¼ b1p þ b2p  b3p  b4p: In some specifications, k is set to be the average monthly turnover.
The t-statistic, reported in the parentheses, is estimated using a GMM framework that takes into account
the pre-estimation of the betas. The R2 is obtained in a single cross-sectional regression, and the adjusted
R2 is reported in parentheses.
Constant EðcpÞ b1p b2p b3p b4p bnet;p R2
Panel A: size portfolios
1 0.087 0.047 0.865 0.910
(0.274) (—) (1.864) (0.910)
2 0.059 0.056 0.823 0.912
(0.201) (2.139) (1.768) (0.904)
3 0.265 1.144 0.757
(0.789) (2.270) (0.747)
4 0.043 0.047 0.770 1.562 0.912
(0.151) (—) (0.323) (0.685) (0.908)
5 0.055 0.054 0.168 0.984 0.912
(0.186) (1.180) (0.050) (0.266) (0.900)
6 0.032 4.633 5.278 0.902
(0.112) (1.899) (2.104) (0.893)
7 0.073 0.047 0.887 27.387 1.741 0.038 0.913
(0.122) (—) (0.304) (0.342) (0.009) (0.006) (0.901)
8 0.224 0.408 0.079 742.841 42.800 7.933 0.929
(0.552) (1.206) (0.047) (1.157) (0.845) (0.691) (0.911)
Panel B: B/M-by-size properties
1 0.200 0.045 0.582 0.406
(0.680) (—) (1.197) (0.406)
2 0.453 0.167 0.182 0.541
(1.657) (3.452) (0.377) (0.499)
3 0.109 0.748 0.262
(0.348) (1.406) (0.229)
4 0.529 0.045 8.289 8.275 0.502
(1.665) (—) (2.013) (2.198) (0.481)
5 0.187 0.387 18.229 17.458 0.571
(0.626) (3.061) (2.344) (2.265) (0.510)
6 0.574 11.787 11.671 0.483
(1.959) (3.102) (2.902) (0.436)
7 0.425 0.045 4.606 203.397 198.027 3.330 0.788
(0.254) (—) (0.483) (0.200) (0.526) (0.049) (0.758)
8 0.395 0.031 4.545 397.770 195.128 0.380 0.789
(0.638) (0.028) (1.722) (0.115) (1.612) (0.004) (0.733)
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Fig. 4. Size portfolios: the top left panel shows the fitted CAPM returns vs. realized returns using monthly
data 1964–1999 for value-weighted size portfolios. The top right panel shows the same for the liquidity-
adjusted CAPM, and the lower panel shows the relation for the liquidity-adjusted CAPM with
unconstrained risk premia.
V.V. Acharya, L.H. Pedersen / Journal of Financial Economics 77 (2005) 375–410402book-to-market effect. (Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003 reach a similar conclusion.)
Hence, our simple model fails to explain the entire investment universe.
Specification tests. We perform several specification tests of the liquidity-adjusted
CAPM. First, we note that we fail to reject at conventional levels the model-implied
restriction that a ¼ 0 in the liquidity-adjusted CAPM (lines 1–2 and 4–8 of Table 4),
whereas this restriction is rejected for the standard CAPM (at a 10% level in line 3
Table 4A, and at a 5% level in Table 4B). Second, in context of the model with
unrestricted risk premia in line 8 of Table 4, a Wald test fails to reject the five model-
implied restrictions l1 ¼ l2 ¼ l3 ¼ l4; a ¼ 0; and k ¼ k; where k is the calibrated
value. The p-value is 47% in Table 4A and 28% in Table 4B. The CAPM restrictions
l2 ¼ l3 ¼ l4 ¼ 0; a ¼ 0; and k ¼ 0 have p-values of 15% and 8.7%, respectively.
The CAPM is rejected in lines 5 and 6 since bnet is significant.
Another testable restriction implied by the model is that the risk premium equals
the expected net return on the market in excess of the risk-free rate. The point
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Fig. 5. Book-to-market by size portfolios: the top left panel shows the fitted CAPM returns vs. realized
returns using monthly data 1964–1999 for value-weighted BM-size portfolios. The top right panel shows
the same for the liquidity-adjusted CAPM, and the lower panel shows the relation for the liquidity-
adjusted CAPM with unconstrained risk premia.
V.V. Acharya, L.H. Pedersen / Journal of Financial Economics 77 (2005) 375–410 403estimate of the risk premium, l; is larger than the sample average of the excess return
of the market net of transaction costs, EðrMt  rft  kcMt Þ; and the p-value is 6.6% in
regression 1 of Table 4A and 7.3% in Table 4B. In comparison, the test that the
standard CAPM risk premium equals the EðrMt  rft Þ has p-values of 1.2% and 0.8%,
respectively.
Lastly, we test that the linear model has zero average pricing error for all of the
portfolios, a stringent test since it requires that the model is pricing all portfolios
correctly. With illiquidity portfolios, the p-values for the liquidity-adjusted CAPM in
regressions 1, 5, and 8 are, respectively, 8.5%, 9.9%, and 6.8% using a GMM test (as
in Cochrane, 2001, p. 241), which is similar to the cross-sectional regression test of
Shanken (1985). In comparison, the standard CAPM has a p-value of 0.5%. With s
(illiquidity) portfolios the GMM p-values for the liquidity-adjusted CAPM are,
respectively, 16%, 42%, and 65%, and the p-value for the standard CAPM is 6.6%.
The specification tests for size portfolios are similar. This confirms the visual
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Table 7
Controlling for size and book-to-market
This table reports the estimated coefficients from cross-sectional regressions of the liquidity-adjusted
CAPM for 25 value-weighted size and B/M-by-size portfolios using monthly data during 1964–1999 with
an equal-weighted market portfolio. We consider special cases of the relation
Eðrpt  rft Þ ¼ aþ kEðcpt Þ þ l1b1p þ l2b2p þ l3b3p þ l4b4p þ lbnet;p þ l5 lnðsizepÞ þ l6BMp,
where bnet;p ¼ b1p þ b2p  b3p  b4p; lnðsizepÞ is the time-series average of the natural log of the ratio of the
portfolio’s market capitalization at the beginning of the month to the total market capitalization, and BMp
is the time-series average of the average monthly book-to-market of the stocks constituting the portfolio.
In some specifications, k is set to be the average monthly turnover. The t-statistic, reported in the
parentheses, is estimated using a GMM framework that takes into account the pre-estimation of betas.
The R2 is obtained in a single cross-sectional regression, and the adjusted R2 is reported in parentheses.
Constant EðcpÞ b1p b2p b3p b4p bnet;p lnðsizepÞ B/M R2
Panel A: liquidity portfolios
1 1.358 0.034 2.158 0.142 1.076 0.865
(1.843) (—) (2.114) (1.247) (1.871) (0.852)
2 1.286 0.028 1.970 0.129 1.120 0.865
(1.501) (1.129) (1.869) (0.950) (2.215) (0.838)
3 0.818 0.798 0.043 1.350 0.850
(0.837) (0.651) (0.302) (1.724) (0.829)
4 1.273 0.034 3.740 6.145 0.155 0.679 0.869
(1.459) (—) (0.576) (0.891) (1.054) (0.814) (0.850)
5 0.441 0.018 12.278 13.565 0.068 0.159 0.882
(0.613) (0.227) (1.292) (1.453) (0.871) (0.229) (0.850)
6 0.730 9.313 10.988 0.098 0.339 0.880
(0.939) (1.884) (2.106) (0.788) (0.598) (0.856)
7 0.491 0.034 1.253 124.221 18.359 16.421 0.078 0.205 0.884
(0.369) (—) (0.714) (0.818) (0.180) (1.230) (0.313) (0.208) (0.853)
8 0.557 0.059 1.300 183.466 19.865 17.238 0.087 0.253 0.884
(0.912) (0.298) (2.043) (0.325) (0.208) (0.922) (0.773) (0.376) (0.836)
Panel B: B/M-by-size portfolios
1 0.310 0.045 0.199 0.084 0.251 0.924
(1.040) (—) (0.345) (1.415) (2.892) (0.917)
2 0.317 0.035 0.236 0.091 0.250 0.925
(1.206) (0.684) (0.311) (1.176) (2.905) (0.910)
3 0.365 0.403 0.119 0.246 0.920
(1.177) (0.516) (2.155) (2.749) (0.909)
4 0.311 0.045 0.484 0.696 0.089 0.249 0.924
(1.170) (—) (0.155) (0.262) (1.598) (2.960) (0.913)
5 0.340 0.003 3.145 2.850 0.087 0.259 0.925
(1.083) (0.039) (0.894) (0.846) (1.224) (3.108) (0.906)
6 0.338 2.930 2.639 0.087 0.259 0.925
(1.003) (1.366) (0.613) (1.065) (3.314) (0.910)
7 0.237 0.045 0.490 286.927 38.480 14.711 0.095 0.226 0.932
(1.483) (—) (0.284) (1.063) (0.615) (1.069) (1.613) (2.868) (0.915)
8 0.171 0.284 0.529 916.982 42.353 26.730 0.100 0.233 0.937
(0.249) (0.308) (0.232) (0.344) (0.181) (0.391) (0.735) (0.746) (0.911)
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V.V. Acharya, L.H. Pedersen / Journal of Financial Economics 77 (2005) 375–410 405evidence from Figs. 2–4 that the liquidity-adjusted CAPM has a better fit than the
standard CAPM for these portfolios.
With B/M-by-size portfolios, the Wald test of the liquidity-adjusted CAPM has a
p-value of 47% and the test of zero pricing errors for regressions 1, 5, and 8 are,
respectively, 15.7%, 38%, and 85%. The standard CAPM has a p-value of 23% for
the Wald test and 3.2% for the test of zero pricing errors. The failure to reject the
liquidity-adjusted CAPM using B=M-by-size portfolios may be due to low power
since, as discussed above, the model fit is not good for these portfolios.5. Conclusion
This paper derives a simple model of liquidity risk. The model shows that the
CAPM applies for returns net of illiquidity costs. This implies that investors should
worry about a security’s performance and tradability both in market downturns and
when liquidity ‘‘dries up.’’ Said differently, the required return of a security i is
increasing in the covariance between its illiquidity and the market illiquidity,
covtðcitþ1; cMtþ1Þ; decreasing in the covariance between the security’s return and the
market illiquidity, covtðritþ1; cMtþ1Þ; and decreasing in the covariance between its
illiquidity and market returns, covtðcitþ1; rMtþ1Þ: The model further shows that positive
shocks to illiquidity, if persistent, are associated with a low contemporaneous returns
and high predicted future returns.
Hence, the model gives an integrated view of the existing empirical evidence
related to liquidity and liquidity risk, and it generates new testable predictions. We
find that the liquidity-adjusted CAPM explains the data better than the standard
CAPM, while still exploiting the same degrees of freedom. Further, we find weak
evidence that liquidity risk is important over and above the effects of market risk and
the level of liquidity. The model has a reasonably good fit for portfolios sorted by
liquidity, liquidity variation, and size, but it fails to explain the book-to-market
effect.
The model provides a framework in which we can study the economic significance
of liquidity risk. We find that liquidity risk explains about 1.1% of cross-sectional
returns when the effect of average liquidity is calibrated to the typical holding period
in the data and the model restriction of a single risk premium is imposed. About 80%
of this effect is due to the liquidity sensitivity to the market return, covtðcitþ1; rMtþ1Þ; an
effect not previously studied in the literature. Freeing up risk premia leads to larger
estimates of the liquidity risk premium, but these results are estimated imprecisely
because of collinearity between liquidity and liquidity risk.
While the model gives clear predictions that seem to have some bearing in the
data, it is obviously simplistic. The model and the empirical results are suggestive of
further theoretical and empirical work. In particular, it would be of interest to
explain the time-variation in liquidity, and our finding of ‘‘flight to liquidity’’ namely
that stocks that are illiquid in absolute terms also are more liquidity risky in the sense
of having high values of all three liquidity betas. Another interesting topic is the
determination of liquidity premia in a general equilibrium with liquidity risk and
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probability of living more than one period approaches zero, then our equilibrium
economy is approached, assuming continuity. Hence, our effects would also be
present in the more general economy, although endogenous holding periods may
imply a smaller effect of liquidity risk (as in Constantinides, 1986). The effect of
liquidity risk is strengthened, however, if investors have important reasons to trade
frequently. Such reasons include return predictability and wealth shocks (as
considered in the context of liquidity by Lynch and Tan, 2003), differences of
opinions (e.g., Harris and Raviv, 1993), asymmetric information (e.g., He and Wang,
1995), institutional effects (e.g., Allen, 2001), taxes (e.g., Constantinides, 1983), etc.
It would be interesting to determine the equilibrium impact of liquidity risk in light
of such trading motives.Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
We first solve the investment problem of any investor n at time t. We assume, and
later confirm, that the price at time t þ 1 is normally distributed conditional on time-
t information. Hence, the investor’s problem is to choose optimally the number of
shares, yn ¼ ðyn;1; . . . ; yn;I Þ; to purchase according to
max
yn2RIþ
EtðW ntþ1Þ 
1
2
An vartðW ntþ1Þ
 
, (1)
where
W ntþ1 ¼ ðPtþ1 þ Dtþ1  Ctþ1Þ>yn þ rf ðent  P>t ynÞ (2)
and ent is this agent’s endowment. If we disregard the no-short-sale constraint, the
solution is
yn ¼ 1
An
ðvartðPtþ1 þ Dtþ1  Ctþ1ÞÞ1ðEtðPtþ1 þ Dtþ1  Ctþ1Þ  rf PtÞ. (3)
We shortly verify that, in equilibrium, this solution does not entail short-selling. In
equilibrium,
P
n y
n ¼ S; where S ¼ ðS1; . . . ; SI Þ is the total supply of shares. This
implies the equilibrium condition that
Pt ¼ 1
rf
½EtðPtþ1 þ Dtþ1  Ctþ1Þ  A vartðPtþ1 þ Dtþ1  Ctþ1ÞS, (4)
where A ¼ ðPn 1=AnÞ1: The unique stationary linear equilibrium is
Pt ¼ Uþ
rD
rf  rD Dt 
rC
rf  rC Ct, (5)
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U ¼ 1
rf  1
rf ð1 rDÞ
rf  rD D¯ 
rf ð1 rCÞ
rf  rC C¯

A var r
f
rf  rD t 
rf
rf  rC Zt
 
S

. ð6Þ
With this price, conditional expected net returns are normally distributed, and any
investor n holds a fraction A=An40 of the market portfolio S40 so he is not short-
selling any securities. Therefore, our assumptions are satisfied in equilibrium.
Finally, since investors have mean-variance preferences, the conditional CAPM
holds for net returns. See, for instance, Huang and Litzenberger (1988). Rewriting in
terms of net returns yields the result stated in the proposition. &
Proof of Proposition 2
The conditional expected return on a portfolio q is computed using (5):
Etðrqtþ1Þ ¼ Et
P
q
tþ1 þ Dqtþ1
P
q
t
 
¼
EtðUq þ rfrf rD D
q
tþ1  r
C
rf rC C
q
tþ1Þ
Uq þ rD
rf rD D
q
t  r
C
rf rC C
q
t
, ð7Þ
so we have
q
qCqt
Etðrqtþ1  rf Þ
1
ðPqt Þ2
 ðr
CÞ2
rf  rC P
q
t þ
rC
rf  rC EtðP
q
tþ1 þ Dqtþ1Þ
 
. ð8Þ
This partial derivative is greater than zero under the conditions given in the
proposition. &
Proof of Proposition 3
The conditional covariance between illiquidity and return for a portfolio q is
covtðcqtþ1; rqtþ1Þ ¼
1
ðPqt Þ2
covtðCqtþ1 ; Pqtþ1 þ Dqtþ1Þ
¼ 1ðPqt Þ2
covt C
q
tþ1 ;
rf
rf  rD D
q
tþ1 
rC
rf  rC C
q
tþ1
 
¼ 1ðPqt Þ2
rf
rf  rD q
>SCDq  r
C
rf  rC q
>SCq
 
, ð9Þ
which yields the proposition. &
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